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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ABSTENTION & ABORTION:
APPLICATION OF THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD TO "CERTIFICATE OF

NEED" REGULATIONS. PlannedParenthoodof GreaterIowa, Inc. v.

Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042 (8h Cir. 1997).
I. INTRODUCTION

In PlannedParenthood of GreaterIowa, Inc. v. Atchison,' the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals focused on two important principles of federal law,
each markedly different from the other.2 The controversy centered on the
construction of a proposed abortion facility by Planned Parenthood of Greater4
Iowa (PPI). 3 Following the imposition of several Certificate of Need (CON)
Regulations by Iowa's Department of Health (Department), PPI filed suit in
federal district court.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit addressed two separate issues: first, whether
the district court had abused its discretion in failing to abstain from hearing
6 and second, whether
PPI's claim under the principles of Younger v. Harris;
requiring the clinic to undergo CON review would impose an undue burden on
the right of access to abortion, thereby qualifying as unconstitutional under the
newly tailored analysis of PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey.7 The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's decision allowing the
injunction, as abstention under Younger was inappropriate.8 The court also
determined that the CON regulations would impose an undue burden on a
woman's right to abortion under the Casey analysis.9
This casenote discusses the scenario of facts leading up to the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Atchison. The note then reviews the application of
1. 126 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 1997).

2. See id.
3. See id. at 1044.
4. See id.
Certificate of need is the common name for a diverse group of state health care laws
attempting to control health care costs by regulating supply. These laws require that
a permit, usually called a certificate of need, be issued by a state health planning
agency before a health care facility may construct or expand, offer a new service,
or purchase equipment exceeding a certain cost. A CON will not be issued unless
a new facility or service is genuinely needed in a given community. Although
determining need can be problematic, CON laws provide statutory and rule criteria
to guide the issuing agency's discretion.
Patrick J. McGinley, Beyond Health Care Reform: ReconsideringCertificateof Need Laws in
a "ManagedCompetition" System, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 141, 144-45 (1995). See also infra
note 16 for a description of the purpose and effect of the Iowa CON regulations.
5. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1044.
6. 401 U.S. 37(1971).
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. See Atchison, 126 F.3dat 1048.
9. See id. For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Casey, see infra Part III.B.3.a.
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Younger abstention principles both prior to and following the decision in
Younger v. Harris and the foundations for state regulation of the right to
abortion. Finally, the casenote discusses Atchison's extension of and impact
on these doctrines as relating to similar CON regulations.
II. FACTS

In 1995, Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa (PPI) announced plans to
construct and operate a new health care facility in the Quad Cities area of Iowa
and Illinois.' ° The proposed facility was to provide basic family planning
health services, including abortions." Because the clinic would provide
pregnancy termination options for pregnant women, its establishment met great
opposition in the area.'2 Those opposed to the project wasted little time in
informing various state officials in Iowa of their disapproval.13 This discontent
led those officials to pressure the Iowa Department of Health (Department) to
require that the new clinic submit to the state's CON regulations, although
those regulations
were generally inapplicable to similar non-abortion
4
facilities.

The Iowa CON statutes date back to 1977." The Iowa legislature enacted
them at that time to ensure that any new offering of health care services was
both necessary and accomplished in the most efficient manner possible. 6
Before a formal CON review begins, the sponsor of a project may request a
determination from the Department as to whether the new facility will be
subject to the applicable regulations. 7 In order to formally commence the
CON review process, the sponsor of a project must submit a "letter of intent"

10. See Brief for Appellee at 2, PlannedParenthoodof GreaterIowa, Inc. v. Atchison,
126 F.3d 1042 ( 8 h Cir. 1997) (No. 96-4076). The Quad Cities area includes Davenport and
Bettendorf, Iowa, and Moline and Rock Island, Illinois. See id.
11. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1043.
12. See id. at 1044. The principal opponent of PPI's plans was the Roman Catholic
Diocese of Davenport, Iowa. See Brief for Appellee at 7, Atchison (No. 96-4076).
13. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1044.
14. See id. at 1046.
15. See id. at 1044. See IOWACODE § 135.63 (1997).
16. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1044. The CON process is designed to ensure "that the
offering or development of new institutional health services be accomplished in a manner which
is orderly, economical and consistent with a goal of providing necessary and adequate
institutional health services to all the people of [Iowa] .
Id. (citing 1977 Iowa Acts 75
(codified at IOWA CODE § 135.63 (1997)).
17. See Brief for Appellee at 6, Atchison (No. 96-4076). This is an important point
because the sponsor of a project has several options upon learning that a new facility is subject
to CON review, such as revising its plans or filing an action in federal court. See Atchison, 126
F.3d at 1047.
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to the Department describing the proposed facility.' At least sixty days
thereafter, the sponsor may submit an application, pay a fee, and await the
Department's determination.' 9 If the Department accepts the application, a
formal review of the project will commence.2 0
In November of 1995, PPI received a letter from the Department of Health
stating that their new facility might be subject to review under the CON
statutes.2 ' A second letter followed in January of 1996, as PPI had not
responded to the Department's first attempt. 2 In response to that letter, PPI
sent a letter to the Department in March of 1997, requesting a determination of
whether the new facility was subject to CON review.23 Less than one month
later, the Department answered PPI's request in the affirmative.2 4 Soon
thereafter, PPI filed its action in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 198325
and obtained an injunction prohibiting the Department from proceeding
further.26 The Department appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
claiming that the district court had heard the case improperly under the holding
27
of Younger v. Harris.
The court of appeals rejected the Department's claim that the exchange of
letters between the parties signaled the commencement of the review process.28
18. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1044. The letter of intent includes a description of the new
facility, its proposed location, and an estimate of its cost. See IOWA CODE § 135.65 (1997).
The Iowa Code states that this letter should be submitted as soon as possible "after initiation of
the applicant's planning process .... ." Id. Upon receipt of an applicant's letter, the Department
conducts a preliminary review of the project's status noting any factors which may result in a
denial of a certificate of need. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. The formal review process involves two steps. The first step requires the
Department to evaluate each application against specific criteria enumerated at § 135.64 of the
Iowa Code. See IOWA CODE § 135.64 (1997). The second step involves conducting a public
hearing on the matter prior to the completion of the previous step. See id.
21. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1044. Several Department of Health officials admitted that
similar health care facilities were ordinarily not subject to CON review. See id. at 1045. The
Iowa Code contains various exceptions that routinely remove such facilities from the text of the
statutes. See IOWA CODE § 135.63 (1997).
22. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1054.
23. See id. at 1044.
24. See id.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This section generally provides for civil actions for persons
claiming their civil rights have been violated under color of state law. See id, In this case, the
alleged violation involved the right of access to abortion. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1044.
26. See Atchison, 126 F. 3d at 1045.
27. See id. at 1046. As will be discussed in the following sections, the doctrine of
abstention under Younger holds that, absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts should
resist any temptation to become involved in disputes currently subject to state judicial
proceedings until those proceedings are complete. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971);
see also infra notes 29 and 32 for more information on this doctrine.
28. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1047. The Department contended that PPI's request as to
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The court stated that the alleged proceedings were neither "ongoing" nor
"judicial in nature" as required to trigger the abstention rules.2 9 The court
further determined that the district court had not erred in holding that the
arbitrary application of the CON statutes to PPI's clinic imposed an unconstitutional burden on the right of access to abortion.30
III. BACKGROUND
The decision in Atchison addressed two separate areas of law. Therefore,
the following is divided into two separate parts corresponding to those topics.
The first part of this section discusses the history and evolution of abstention
under the Younger doctrine and its subsequent extension to non-criminal
proceedings. The second part of this section discusses the rise of abortion as
a right guaranteed to all women and the history of state regulations levied
against that right.
A.

The Evolution of Younger Abstention
1.

Policy Against FederalInterference with State Proceedings:
History and the Younger Doctrine

Based on principles of federalism, both legislators and judges alike have
consistently expressed a desire to prohibit federal court interference with
ongoing state court proceedings. 3' Apparently, the initial statutory recognition
of this policy was in a 1793 Act that prohibited federal courts from issuing
injunctions to stay such proceedings.32 That Act's modem day equivalent
expresses a similar prohibition. 33 Over the years little has changed, as courts
its status qualified as the required "letter of intent" to initiate CON review. See supra note 18
for a discussion of this requirement. Had the court agreed, Younger would have certainly
applied, as its teachings may be exercised over state administrative proceedings. See Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
29. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1047. Younger abstention will apply to civil matters, even
those judicial in nature, where: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings which are judicial in
nature; (2) important state interests are at issue; and (3) the proceedings present an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432.
30. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1048.
31. See Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
32. See id. "[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court
of a state .... " Id. (citing Act of March 2, 1793, c. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334). In explaining
Congress' intent under this act, the Court has said "The Act... expresses the desire of Congress
to avoid friction between the federal government and the states resulting from the intrusion of
federal authority into the orderly functioning of a state's judicial process." Touchey v. New
York Life Ins. Co. Phoenix Fin. Corp., 314 U.S. 118, 135 (1941).
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). "A court of the United States may not grant an
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have consistently applied this doctrine in their rulings.34 The following
discussion includes excerpts from the history of that application leading up to
the Younger decision.
Generally, a federal court will interfere with state court proceedings only
upon showing of exceptional circumstances.35 Beal v. Missouri Pacific
RailroadCorp. involved state criminal proceedings following the violation of
a Nebraska railroad employment law.36 The lower court enjoined the
prosecution after finding a threat of irreparable injury to the defendants.37 The
Supreme Court reversed this decision.3" The Court stated that interference with
state court criminal proceedings should be undertaken only in exceptional
circumstances and that such circumstances were not present.39 The Court noted
that high regard must be afforded to all state proceedings in recognition of the
justified independence of state governments. 4° Two years later in Douglas v.
Jeannette, the Court ruled against a party seeking to restrain enforcement of
a licensing statute requiring parties to obtain a license prior to the "solicitation
of orders for merchandise."4 2 The Court held that where a criminal proceeding
has not been shown to be other than in good faith, the federal courts will defer
to state courts as the final arbiters subject to federal court review on constitutional issues. 43 The Court's decision in Douglas, while adhering to the
extraordinary circumstances requirement, placed particularly heavy weight on
noting that the prosecution had been brought in good faith."

injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
Id.
34. See Sharyl Walker, Judicial Abstention and Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction: A
Reconciliation,67 CORNELL L. REv. 219 (1981).
35. See Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Corp., 312 US. 45 (1941).
36. See id. at 46.
37. See id. at 50. The Court in Beal found "danger of irreparable injury in the threatened
multiplicity of prosecutions...." Id.
38. See id. at 51.
39. See id. at 50.
40. See id. In its introductory discussion of the policy against interference with state
criminal proceedings, the Court pointed out that this policy extended only to criminal sanctions
brought in good faith. See id. at 49. Courts consistently adhere to this good faith requirement
including the decision in Younger. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 47 (citing Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943)).
41. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
42. Id. at 159.
43. See id. at 163.
44. See id. See also supra note 40 for a discussion of this good-faith requirement. "It
does not appear from the record that petitioners [in this case] have been threatened with any
injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in goodfaith
.... " Douglas, 319 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
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Six years prior to Younger, the Supreme Court announced a decision that
many believed struck a major blow to the policy of federal restraint.4 5 In
Dombrowski v. Pfister,' several civil rights proponents sought an injunction
to restrain state officials from commencing criminal prosecutions against
them. 4 7 The district court dismissed the complaint stating that because
irreparable harm was not imminent, the case was appropriate for application of
the abstention doctrine.48 On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the longstanding policy against interfering with state court criminal proceedings.49 In
reversing the district court's decision, the Court applied an important exception
to this policy. Appellants' central mode of attack against the prosecution
focused on the bad faith efforts of enforcing that prosecution by state
officials.5 The Court found this to be important and determined that the
necessary threat of irreparable injury had been established.5 ' Based on these
findings, the Court held that abstention was improper. 2 Although this opinion
appeared to represent a major deviation from established principles at that time,
the Court5 did
little between Dombrowski and Younger to encourage that
3
sentiment.
Following the fairly consistent history of prohibition against federal
judicial interference with state proceedings, the Supreme Court's decision in
Younger v. Harriscame as little surprise to most observers.5 4 In Younger, the
appellant, Harris, claimed that his ongoing prosecution under a particular
California criminal statute was unjust as the statute violated his constitutional
rights under the First 5 and Fourteenth 56 Amendments. 57 With the criminal
45. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS,
1994).

ch. 8, § 52A, at 341 (5th ed.

46. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. See id. at 482.

48. See id. at 482-83.
49. See id. at 483. "[T]he Court has recognized that federal interference with a State's
good-faith administration of its criminal laws is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal
framework." Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
50. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 490. The Court defined prosecutions not brought in
good faith as those brought "without any hope of ultimate success, but only to discourage
appellants' civil rights activities." Id.
51.

See id. at 490.

52. See id.
53. See WRIGHT, supra note 45, ch. 8, § 52, at 341.
54. See WRIGHT, supra note 45, ch. 8, § 52, at 341. In Younger, the Court appeared

concerned with ensuring that the Dombrowski holding was not extended beyond situations
involving bad faith prosecutions. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 48. See also George S. King,
FederalInjunctive ReliefAgainst Pending State Civil Proceedings: Younger Days Are Here

Again, 44 LA. L. REv. 967,968 (1984).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Harris relied on the First amendment for its protections
concerning free speech. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 39.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Harris relied on the Fourteenth amendment's provisions
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action pending in California, Harris instituted his action in federal district court
seeking an injunction to halt his prosecution.58 The district court agreed that
the statute was unconstitutional and granted the requested relief5 9
The Supreme Court began its opinion with a review of the strong federal
policy against interference with ongoing state proceedings.' The Court stated
that Harris had an adequate opportunity in the present case to raise constitutional challenges and there was no indication that the prosecution had been
brought in bad faith. 61 The Court held that federal intervention in this case was
inappropriate and reversed the district court's decision. 2 The Court's decision
in Younger was really nothing more than an application of an already widely
followed federal policy. 63 Some commentators have called the application of

Younger abstention the "irreparable injury" standard.'
In making its final determination, the Younger Court singled out
Dombrowski to distinguish its application of this policy.65 The Court stated

that Dombrowski did not upset the long settled doctrines of federal court
abstention, but instead merely implied that certain extraordinary circumstances
may call for federal interference with state criminal proceedings.6
2.

Extension of the Younger DoctrineBeyond CriminalProceedings

Following the Younger decision, courts soon began expanding the
Younger doctrine to cases involving pending civil actions. 67 These cases
generally involved state civil proceedings that implicated "important state
interests., 68 The case most clearly outlining the framework for applying
calling for equal protection under the law. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 39.

57. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 39. The act was known as the "Criminal Syndicalism Act,"
and it essentially prohibited the teaching or aiding and abetting of the commission of any crime,
act of violence, or terroristic act See id. at 38. Mr. Harris was prosecuted for teaching socialist

and communist doctrines. See id. at 39.
58. See id. at 38-39.
59. See id. at 40.
60. See id. at 43. See also supra note 32 for a discussion of this policy.
61. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 49. See also supra notes 40, 44, 49 and 50 for a review of

the history underlying the good-faith requirement.
62. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.

63. See id. at 50. 64. See King, supranote 54, at 970. The application of this standard requires that "the
federal plaintiff ...demonstrate that his state-court defense will not adequately protect his

federal rights because of bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstance in order to obtain
the federal injunction." King, supra note 54, at 970.
65. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 53.
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
68. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1974). The Court in Huffman stated that
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Younger abstention to civil proceedings was Middlesex County Ethics
Commission v. Garden State Bar Association.69
The Middlesex case involved a challenge to the constitutionality of certain
disciplinary rules of a New Jersey Bar Ethics Committee.7 ° After having been
served a complaint from the committee, Hinds, an attorney challenging the
rules, filed suit in federal court.7 The district court dismissed the suit based on
Younger abstention principles. 7z The Third Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal on the grounds that the proceedings did not provide Hinds with an
adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.73
In making its determination, the Supreme Court reviewed the policies and
principles underlying Younger and its progeny.74 Based on its prior decisions,
the Court laid the framework for analysis in such cases. 75 The Court stated that
making an appropriate determination in the dispute required answering three
questions.76 These involved whether the state action constituted an ongoing
judicial proceeding, whether the proceeding implicated important state
interests, and whether the plaintiff was allowed an adequate opportunity to
raise any constitutional challenges. 77 In applying this framework, the Court
first determined that the proceedings at issue in Middlesex were ongoing and
judicial in nature.7' The Court also found that the issues presented were
extremely important to the state of New Jersey and satisfied the second element
required for the application of Younger.79 Finally, the Court held that Hinds
had sufficient opportunity to raise any valid constitutional challenge. 0
For the most part, courts have overwhelmingly accepted and applied the
"definitive test" for Younger abstention enumerated in Middlesex.8 For
the importance of a state's interest may be shown where the civil proceeding is instituted for
the protection of interests also protected by the state's criminal laws. See id. at 604.
69. 457 U.S. 423 (1981).
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. at 425.
See id. at 429.
See id.
See id.

74. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431. The Court noted that abstention under Younger
should be observed absent extraordinary circumstances and that these policies applied equally
well to noncriminal proceedings. See id. at 431-32.
75. See id. at 432.
76. See id.
77. See id.

78. See id. at 433. The Court made this determination without much analysis of the
present case and essentially based it on New Jersey precedents. See id.
79. See id. at 434. "The State of New Jersey has an extremely important interest in
maintaining and assuring the professional conduct of the attorneys it licenses ....
[The]
objective of which is 'the protection of the public'...." Id.
80. See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435.
81. See Jeremy D. Sosna, Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The ContinuingSaga
of the Younger Doctrine, 82 IowA L. REv. 275, 285 (1996).
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example, in Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney," a 1990 Eighth Circuit decision,
the court applied both Younger abstention and the Middlesex criteria.8 3 The
Alleghany decision is also noteworthy for its description of the types of
proceedings that qualify as "judicial."' 4 The Eighth Circuit again applied the
Middlesex refinements in a noncriminal proceeding in Warmus v. Melahn.s5
The decision in Warmus provides a good example of the application of the
Middlesex tests to a civil rights case. 6
B.

The Establishment of Abortion as a Right and Analysis of State
Regulation

Abortion in the United States has been considered a fundamental right
since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Roe v. Wade.87 This right,
however, is not without limitation. This part of the note discusses the
establishment of that right by Roe and other cases and the acceptable
limitations thereto.
1.

Roe v. Wade

In 1973 the United States Supreme Court, in a highly controversial
decision, held invalid a Texas statute that made it a crime to procure or perform
an abortion in most cases. 8 8 In Roe, the Court held that such statutes violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects an
individual's right to privacy against state interference.8 9 The Court, however,
did not state that this right was unlimited. 9° The Court determined that some
state regulation was appropriate so long as certain boundaries were not
crossed.9

82. 896 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1990).
83. See id. at 1141. In Alleghany, the court noted that the district court had applied the
three requirements of Younger as refined by Middlesex County. See id.
84. See id.at 1143. "A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist." Id. (citing New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989)).
85. 62 F.3d 252 (8h Cir. 1995). See also Fuller v. Ulland, 76 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 1996).
86. See Warmus, 62 F.3d at 256-57. This case involved a § 1983 action brought against
several state officials concerning allegations that those officials conspired to drive plaintiffs
company out of business. See id. at 253.
87. 410U.S. 113(1973).
88. See id. at 164-65.
89. See id. at 163. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
90. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
91. See id. at 155.
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The Roe decision was essentially based on the "fundamental" 9 2 right to
privacy, embodied in the Due Process Clause. 93 The Court noted that this right
had been extended to such activities as family relationships, child rearing, and
procreation, and could properly be interpreted as including a woman's decision
of whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 94 The Court stated that the harm
that would fall upon a woman denied this right was clear. 95
Although the Court made clear its strong desire to provide women with
the ability to make this personal decision, it strongly asserted its position that
this right was not without limitation. 96 The Court noted that the state has a
strong interest in protecting both the health of the mother and the potential
human life.97 These interests qualified as the necessary compelling state
interest required for the regulation of fundamental rights.9
In determining the extent to which a state could regulate this right, the
Court attempted to draw bright lines between acceptable and unacceptable state
regulation." After some consideration, the Court determined that the point at
which the state's interest was truly compelling should be set at the end of the
first trimester of the pregnancy.'0 For the period of time prior to this point, a
woman and her physician were free to determine whether or not to terminate
the pregnancy.'01 During the time subsequent to the first trimester but prior to
viability, the state could regulate abortion in ways aimed at protecting only the
92. Fundamental Rights are defined as "[t]hose rights which have their source, and are
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed, in the federal Constitution ....
[A] law will be held
violative of the due process clause if it is not closely tailored to promote a compelling or
overriding interest of government." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 674 (6th ed. 1990).
93. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
94. SeeRoe, 410U.S. at 152.
95. See id. at 153.
96. See id. at 155. Although the Court determined that the right to abortion was founded
in the fundamental right to privacy, it noted that "the pregnant woman [is not] isolated in her
privacy. She carries an embryo and, later a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the
developing young in the human uterus." Id. at 158.
97. See id. at 162.
98. See id. at 155. Courts have long recognized the requirement that state regulation of
fundamental rights serve a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). "The
'compelling state interest' standard ... calls upon the state to show more than a link of
reasonableness. The state must demonstrate the pressing importance of the classification in the
context of some necessary governmental objective." Dunham v. Pussifer, 312 F. Supp. 411,
417 (D. Vt. 1970). See also supra note 92 for a related discussion on fundamental rights.
99. See C. Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe'd to Confusion: PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,
30 Hous. L. REv. 1457, 1458 (1993).
100. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. "One of the reasons for this finding was that the mortality
rate for abortions in the first trimester is less than the mortality rate for childbirth. Thus, the
state could not argue that prohibiting abortion protected maternal health, because the alternative,
childbirth, was actually more dangerous." Howard, supra note 99, at 1468.
101. SeeRoe,410U.S.at 163.
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mother's health.'0 2 After the point in time following the fetus's attainment of
viability,' 0 3 the state could regulate and even prohibit abortion except where
required for the life or health of the mother.' 0 4 This became known as the
trimester framework, and essentially provided that a state could impose more
restrictive regulations on the right to choose based on how far along a woman's
pregnancy had progressed.'0 °
In a companion case to Roe, the Supreme Court strictly adhered to the
trimester framework, even finding one statute unconstitutional because its
regulations did not preclude the first trimester of pregnancy."° In Doe v.
Bolton, petitioners brought an action challenging the validity of a Georgia
abortion statute requiring abortions to be performed only in certain licensed
facilities. 7 The Court invalidated the statute as it made no provisions to
remove from its grasp those abortions performed during the first trimester of
pregnancy. 0 8 Nevertheless, the Court stated that the right to abortion Was far
from unlimited.'09 The regulation would be upheld were it redrafted to exclude
abortions during the first trimester, so long as those regulations were reasonably related to the state's interest."0
As both the Roe and Doe cases illustrate, under the trimester framework,
state regulations were scrutinized by focusing not on their nature or effect but
on the time during the pregnancy in which they were imposed."' Unhappy
with this analysis, the Court began to lean toward imposing a different
102. See id. at 164. An interesting point concerning regulation during the second trimester
was that it was allowed only so long as it was related to protecting the mother's health. See id.
The state's interest in protecting the potential human life of the child was not sufficiently
compelling at this stage in the pregnancy. See id. Examples of permissible regulation at this
stage included the following: requirements concerning the person performing the abortion;
requirements concerning the licensing of that individual; requirements as to the facility in which
the procedure will be performed; and requirements as to the licensing of that facility. See id.
at 163.
103. See id. at 164-65. Viability is defined as the point at which "the fetus... presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." See id. at 163.
104. See id. at 164. After viability, the more compelling interest of the state shifts to that
of the potential human life. Thus, at that point the state is given broadly sweeping authority in
its regulation over the abortion right. See id. Earlier in its decision, the Court accepted that
viability ordinarily occurred at approximately the beginning of the seventh month, or third
trimester, of the pregnancy. See id. at 160. The point at which viability is attained is very
important because the changes imposed by the Court in PlannedParenthoodof Southeast
Pennsylvaniav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), concerning analysis of state regulation, have not
affected regulations imposed after viability. See infra discussion Part III.3.a.
105. See id. at 165.
106. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 170 (1973).
107. See id. at 184.
108. See id. at 195.
109. See id. at 189.
110. See id. at 194.
111. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163; Doe, 410 U.S. at 195.
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standard, called the undue burden standard of analysis." 2 The Casey"'
4
decision discussed below eliminated the trimester framework of Roe."
2.

Evolution of the Undue Burden Standard
a.

Defining Undue Burden

When courts first utilized the undue burden standard, it was applied
without having been sufficiently defined."' In Casey, the Court stated that an
undue burden was one that placed a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion." 6 Unfortunately, a more detailed definition has not been
offered. In fact, several commentators have criticized the Court's use of this
standard on precisely this point." 7 It appears that the only true guide in
determining what regulations impose undue burdens can be derived from the
decisions and holdings of earlier courts on the subject."'
b.

Application to Abortion Regulations in General

Following the Roe decision, the courts heard many cases involving state
regulation of abortion. In several of these cases discussed below the Court
deviated to some extent from the trimester framework of analysis as outlined
in Roe. Rather, these cases incorporated the use of the undue burden standard
in analyzing state regulations." 9
112. See Valerie J. Pacer, Note, Salvaging The Undue Burden Standard-IsIt A Lost
Cause?, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 295 (1995). "[T]he term undue burden... [is generally equated]
...with the concept of an obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion." Id. at 299.
113. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
114. Seeid. at 873.
115. The decisions first incorporating this standard did so without expressly defining what
would or would not constitute an undue burden. Those decisions would simply state whether
or not the enactment at issue satisfied this standard without much explanation. See, e.g., Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
116. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. "A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. See infra notes 154-184 for
further discussion of Casey.
117. See Howard, supra note 99, at 1475. The author criticizes the "imprecision" of the
Casey opinion, stating that the Court failed to define the factors or guidelines which lower
courts should consider in evaluating state regulations of abortion. See Howard, supra note 99,
at 1475.
118. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 837 (holding that spousal notification provisions of a
Pennsylvania act constituted an undue burden). See also infra Part III.B.2.b for more examples.
119. See Pacer, supra note 112, at 299. According to the author, the initial use of the undue
burden standard was not an attempt to add additional requirements to the Roe framework. The
courts were, however, simply attempting to draw distinctions between those burdens which
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In 1977 the Supreme Court issued a decision incorporating the undue
burden standard of analysis in connection with the trimester framework.' 0 In
Beal v. Doe, the Court faced the task of determining the validity of a Pennsylvania statute that denied the use of Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic
abortions.' The Court recognized the important state interest in protecting the
fetus as discussed in Roe, but stated that such an interest was not compelling
restrictions on a woman's rights until
enough to impose unduly burdensome
1 22
the latter stages of pregnancy.
Later cases applied the undue burden standard without making any
reference to Roe's trimester framework or the time period during which the
burdens were imposed. 2 3 In the related cases of Bellotti I and Bellotti II, the
Supreme Court of the United States considered the validity of a state statute
that required minor children to obtain parental consent prior to obtaining an
abortion. 2 4 In those cases the Court framed the question to be decided as
whether the requirements of the statue unduly burdened the woman's right to
seek an abortion. 25 In Bellotti I, the Court declined to rule on the validity of
the Massachusetts statute, stating that the statute should first be interpreted by
that state's judiciary. 26 Nevertheless, the Court stated that the statute at issue
would not be unconstitutional unless it unduly burdened the minor's right to
abortion. 27 The Court's analysis was in no way similar to that of the Roe
Court28despite the fact that this decision came down only a few years after
Roe. 1
The Supreme Court openly applied the undue burden standard without
any attempt to incorporate that standard into Roe's framework in two very
similar abortion funding cases. 129 In Maher v. Roe, the Court contrasted Roe's
were and were not constitutional. See Pacer, supra note 112, at 299.
120. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). The Roe Court apparently did not foresee this
development as the undue burden standard is not mentioned inthat opinion. See Roe, 410 U.S.
at 113.
121. SeeBeal, 432 U.S. at441.
122. See id. at 446.

123. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976) (hereinafter "Bellotti I"); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (hereinafter "Bellotti II").
124. SeeBellottil, 428 U.S. at 133.
125. SeeBellottiI, 443 U.S. at640.

126. See Belloti I, 428 U.S. at 147. Following the state court's rehearing of the issue, the
federal district court found the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court later affirmed this
decision in Bellotti II. See Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 651.
127. SeeBellottilI, 443 U.S. at 651.

128. See supra Part III.B. 1.for a discussion of the holding in Roe.
129. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). See
Pacer, supra note 112, at 297. The author suggests that these cases represent the first explicit

use of the undue burden standard within the abortion context. This is incorrect as the case of
Beal v. Doe was decided prior to these decisions. However, these cases very well may have
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limited right to choose with state regulations regarding abortion funding. 30
' In
that action,'13 the statute at issue prohibited state funding of abortions that were
not medically necessary. 32 The Court held that because the prohibition did not
place pregnant women in any less favorable position, it did not give rise to an
undue burden. 33 The women would simply have to depend on private sources
to obtain the procedure. ' 34 The Court in Maher briefly mentioned the Roe
trimester framework, but that analysis did not appear to influence its
135
decision.
In a similar case decided three years later, the Court upheld the Maher
analysis as applied to prohibitions against the funding of certain abortions. 136
In Harrisv. McCrae, the Court focused on particular federal legislation that
prohibited the use of Social Security funds to finance medically unnecessary
abortions.1 37 The HarrisCourt recognized the right established in Roe and the
trimester framework analysis. 38 Despite this recognition, the Court based its
upholding of the funding prohibitions on the reasoning of Maher.1 39 The Court
stated that the mere denial of funds for abortion purposes did not place an
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking to terminate her pregnancy. 40
c.

The Undue Burden Standard as a substitute for Roe's
Trimester Framework

The cases discussed above generally incorporated the undue burden
standard of analysis in conjunction with Roe's application of the trimester
represented the first use of the undue burden standard without any attempt to incorporate that
standard into Roe's trimester framework.
130. See Maher,432 U.S. at 474.

131. See id. at 466. This action was instituted by several indigent women who were
residents of Connecticut. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 474. "An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage
as a consequence of Connecticut's decision ... [not to fund abortion]; she continues as before
to be dependent on private sources for the service she desires." Id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 478. Nevertheless, the Court expressly stated that the conclusion in Maher
was not intended as a retreat from the central holding of Roe. The Maher Court made a
distinction between direct state interference and the right of a state to encourage alternative
forms of activity (e.g., childbirth). See id. at 475.
136. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
137. See id. at 300. This legislation, known as the "Hyde Amendment," is discussed in
detail within the opinion. See id. at 302.

138. See id. at 313.

139. See id. at 314.

140. See id. at 315. Similar to the rationale in Maher, the HarrisCourt observed the state's
ability to enact certain legislation aimed at encouraging alternate forms of activity deemed to
be in the best interest of the public. See id.; see also Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
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framework. Even those cases that made no attempt to facilitate this incorporation still clearly distinguished their situation from that of Roe. ' None of the
cases discussed went so far as to do away with the Roe framework or even hint
that such a step was necessary.' 42 Justice O'Connor took this task upon herself
in her dissenting opinions in two cases decided during the 1980's. 143 In each
of those cases, Justice O'Connor's dissent differed drastically from the majority
opinion.
In Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, Inc., the majority of
the Court upheld Roe's trimester framework, stating that the state's interest
does not become sufficiently compelling to allow regulation until the end of the
first trimester.'" The Court stated that this framework continued to provide a
reasonable standard of analysis for regulating the state's interference with the
exercise of this right. 4 ' Justice O'Connor, however, did not agree.'46 In her
dissent, Justice O'Connor observed that the Court's recent decisions had
47
imposed an undue burden standard in analyzing state regulation of abortion.
O'Connor stressed that this standard should be applied to all challenged
regulations regardless of the stage of pregnancy at which the regulation was
imposed.148 Justice O'Connor argued that the trimester framework was not
adequate to serve the competing interests of woman and state. 49 She further
stated that the trimester approach was inappropriate in light of the Court's
acceptance of the fact that technological advancement in abortion procedures
changed many facets of the issue.'5°
141.

See, e.g., Maher, 432 U.S. at 475.

142. See Pacer, supra note 112, at 297-308.
143. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
144. SeeAkron, 462 U.S. at 429.
145. See id. at 430.
146. See id. at 452 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "[I]t is apparent from the Court's opinion
that neither sound constitutional theory nor our need to decide cases based on the application
of neutral principles can accommodate an analytical framework that varies according to the
'stages' of pregnancy.... ." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This dissenting opinion marked
Justice O'Connor's first articulation of her undue burden standard of analysis. See Mark H.
Woltz, Note, A Bold Reaffirmation?PlannedParenthoodv. Casey Opens The Door ForStates
To Enact New Laws To DiscourageAbortion, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1787, 1802 (1993).

147. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Maher,432 U.S. at 464;
Belloti 1, 428 U.S. at 132; and Harris,448 U.S. at 297).
148. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 453-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In what would be possibly the most
damaging of assessments against Roe's trimester framework, Justice O'Connor pointed out that
the "bright line" drawn by Roe had become "blurred" in light of the Court's acceptance of
advancements in medical technology. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra note
100 for a discussion of the impact of medical technology on the Roe decision. With the
acceptance of medical advancements in the safety of early-term abortions, the original
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Justice O'Connor made similar arguments in favor of the new standard in
her dissenting opinion in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians&
Gynecologists, 5 ' decided just three years after Akron. In that dissent, Justice
O'Connor discussed how the unduly burdensome standard had been applied
consistently in favor
of Roe's "outmoded" trimester framework in several
2
recent opinions.
3.

Changing of the Guard
a.

The Casey Decision

With Justice O'Connor and her already well known disapproval of the
Roe analysis leading the way,5 3 the Court eliminated the trimester framework
in the 1992 decision of PlannedParenthoodof SoutheasternPennsylvania v.
Casey. 54 In its place, the Court adopted the undue burden standard as the
appropriate analysis of state regulation of abortion prior to fetal viability.' 55
The Casey suit involved a challenge to five provisions of the Pennsylvania
Abortion Control Act, which placed various restrictions and requirements on
women seeking abortions.'56 The Court upheld the central ruling in Roe, that
women have a right to choose whether or not to terminate their pregnancy prior
to fetal viability. 7 The Court looked past the trimester framework of Roe and
outlined several principles that they felt were better suited to an analysis of
state regulation of abortion.

arguments for prohibiting state regulation in the first trimester were no longer valid. See supra
note 100 for further discussion of these arguments.
151. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 828 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "These principles for evaluating state
regulation of abortion were not newly minted in my dissenting opinion in Akron. Apart from
Roe's outmoded trimester framework, the 'unduly burdensome' standard had been articulated
and applied with fair consistency by this Court in cases such as Harris v. McRae, ... Maher v.
Roe,.. . [and] Beal v. Doe .. " See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
153. See supra Part III.B.2.c for discussion of O'Connor's earlier opinions.
154. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
155. See Sandra L. Tholen & Lisa Baird, Note and Comment, Con Law Is As Con Law
Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey In The State and Federal Courts, 28 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 971 (1995). The fact that the Court did not completely overturn Roe was a shock
to some observers. See id. at 976.
156. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
157. See id. at 871. Recall that Roe's trimester framework prohibited any regulation over
a woman's right to choose during the first trimester and substantially broadened the restrictions
that could be imposed on that right prior to viability, i.e., the beginning of the third trimester.
See supra Part III.B. I for a discussion of Roe.
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The Court recanted the rigid trimester framework as set out in Roe. t'
Although this framework was aimed at proper balancing of the competing
interests of mother and state, the Court determined that it had failed to meet
that objective.' 5 9 The Court stated that the state's profound interest in human
life extended throughout the term of the pregnancy.' ° Consistent with this
sentiment, the Court expressly rejected the trimester framework espoused in
Roe."'6 The Court made clear that the recognition of this substantial state
interest throughout pregnancy precluded the conclusion that all regulations
were unwarranted.'62 Therefore, Roe's prohibition against any state regulation
during the first trimester of pregnancy could not be upheld.' 63
With the trimester framework now out of her way, Justice O'Connor took
advantage of the opportunity to replace it with the undue burden standard.'"
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor declared that the undue burden standard was
the most appropriate means by which to balance the competing interests of
mother and state.' 65 Justice O'Connor stated that an undue burden is an
unconstitutional one.' Such a burden will be found where a law effectively
6
places a substantial burden in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.'
The imposition of this new standard was not as drastic a change as some
may have believed.' 68 Although the analysis now focuses on whether a
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to abortion, this only
applies to the woman's decision prior to viability.' 69 The provisions in Roe
dealing with post-viability regulations remain in effect.'7 ° Further, the
regulations that now may be imposed prior to viability do not extend to blanket
prohibitions of abortion. '' As the Casey decision seemed to imply, the pre158. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
159. See id.

160. See id. at 876. "[T]here is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout
pregnancy." Id.

161.
162.
163.
164.

See id. at 873.
See id. at 876.
See id. at 878.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.

165. See id. at 876. "In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate means of
reconciling the State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty." Id.
166. See id. at 877.
167. See id.Unfortunately, the Court does not supply a more precise definition in this
opinion. See supra Part III.B.2.a, and infra Part III.3.b for related discussions.
168. See Woltz, supra note 146, at 1808. The author points out how, even after Casey, a
woman still has a fundamental right to obtain an abortion prior to viability. See Woltz, supra
note 146, at 1808.
169. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. In defining undue burden, the Court explicitly states that
such a burden must be placed in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.
See id.
170. See id. at 879.

171. See id. at 872. "Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her
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viability impositions by the172state mainly apply to ensuring that the woman's
choice is an informed one.
What the Casey decision essentially means for states attempting to
regulate or influence a woman's choice is that there is now a possibility that
regulations prior to viability may be enacted assuming they do not impose an
7 3 This holding has not affected regulations imposed subsequent
undue burden.Y
to the attainment of viability. 74 The Court, however, made it clear that it
would not draw a precise line in determining when viability had been
reached.'7 5 Unlike Roe, which essentially set viability as occurring by the
beginning of the third trimester, 176 the Casey Court did not set a precise time
but left the door open for future advances in medical technology.117 Essentially, this requires
a determination of when viability has occurred as to each
78
individual fetus.
b.

The Aftermath of Casey

Since its establishment in Casey, the undue burden standard has met with
disapproval from both commentators and judges.'7 9 Harsh criticisms have been
aimed at this new test for its imprecision in defining the factors to be evaluated
by lower courts in applying the standard to state regulations.180 Even at the
time of the Casey decision, Justice Scalia described the undue burden standard
8
as one that would prove unworkable in practice. ' '
Justice Scalia's opinion as to the application of the new standard has
proven correct to a great extent. Of those post-Casey decisions that attempt to
pregnancy before viability, it does not follow that the State is prohibited from taking steps to
ensure that this choice is thoughtful and informed." Id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 879.

174. See id. at 846. "[R]eading Roe and Casey together, a woman has a fundamental right
to obtain a pre-viability abortion, a right that may not be subjected to undue burdens by state
laws." Woltz, supra note 146, at 1808. See also Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law:
Liberty, Equality, And The New Rhetoric of PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV.

77, 145 (1995).
175. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.

176. See supranote 104 for Roe's discussion of viability.
177. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.

178. See id. at 860. "Whenever it may occur, the attainment of viability may continue to
serve as the critical fact, just as it has done since Roe was decided .. " Id.
179. See Howard, supra note 99, at 1475; see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 979 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
180. See Howard, supra note 99, at 1475.
181. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 985 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In obvious disapproval, Justice
Scalia stated that the Court had failed in its attempt to clarify the meaning of the term undue
burden and that requiring federal district judges to apply this standard was "really more than
one should have to bear." Id.
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employ the undue burden standard, few do so with much detail as to its actual
application. 8 2 The majority of cases that take on the undue burden standard
directly tend to look for similarities in the statute at issue and those involved
in Casey."3 Where sufficient similarity exists, lower courts will generally hold
consistently with the Casey decision.'
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In PlannedParenthoodof GreaterIowa, Inc. v. Atchison" 5 the Eighth
Circuit dealt with two distinctly different issues, finding in favor of PPI as to
each one. The first involved the appropriate application of Younger abstention
to the district court's actions. 8 6 The second focused on the determination of
what type of certificate of need (CON) regulations should be held invalid as
creating an unconstitutional burden to the right of access to abortion.8 7
A.

Doctrine of Abstention

The Department's main argument on appeal asserted that the district court
had erred in failing to abstain from hearing PPI's complaint until the CON
process was complete.' The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with
this assessment and held that abstention was not required, as there were no
ongoing state proceedings that qualified as judicial in nature.'8 9
The court began its analysis with a look at the case of Younger v.
Harris,'9 which essentially laid the foundation for the type of abstention at
issue in this case.' 9' In Younger, the Court held that principles of federalism
182. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir.
1995); Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1993); Jane v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp.
865 (D. Utah 1992).
183. See Tholen & Baird, supra note 155, at 1003.
When faced with an abortion regulation substantially similar to those at issue in
Casey, most courts simply rely on the fact that since the Supreme Court upheld a
similar provision in Casey, the one at issue must likewise be constitutional; what we
term the 'looks like Casey, smells like Casey, must be constitutional' approach.
Tholen & Baird, supra note 155, at 1003.
184. See Tholen & Baird, supra note 155, at 1003.
185. 126 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 1997).
186. See id. at 1046.
187. See id. at 1048.
188. See id. at 1046.
189. See id. at 1048.
190. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
191. See supra Part III.A. 1 for a discussion of the evolution of Younger abstention. For an
interesting discussion of the various types of abstention which have arisen in American
jurisprudence see WRIGHT, supra note 45, ch. 8, §§ 52, 52A; see also Walker, supra note 34,
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require that federal courts abstain from hearing a case where state court
proceedings relative thereto are pending. 92 This holding extends to civil suits
so long as certain conditions are satisfied. 193 A 1982 United States Supreme
Court decision' provided that the Younger doctrine could be applied to state
civil proceedings, including those administrative in nature, where the following
factors were present: the state proceedings were ongoing and were judicial in
nature; the state proceedings involved important state interests; and the state
themselves provide a sufficient opportunity to raise federal
proceedings
95
claims. 1
The court's abstention analysis focused on the first criteria enumerated in
the Middlesex decision. 96 That criteria requires that the state proceedings be
ongoing. 97 The Iowa CON statutes provide that a project's sponsor must
submit a letter of intent describing the proposed project. 98 Sixty days
following the submission of that letter, the sponsor may submit a formal
application that, if accepted by the Department, will initiate a formal review of
the project. 19' In its response to various letters received from the Department,
PPI submitted a request for a determination as to the likelihood that it would
be subject to CON review.2 °° The Department claimed that this request was the
required letter of intent, thereby initiating the CON application and review
process.2 ' The Department thus concluded that this was the type of process
that should20 2 be considered ongoing for purposes of abstention under
Middlesex.
at 219.
192. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1046. "[T]he National Government will fare best if the
States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
Id. (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44).
ways ....
193. See id.
194. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
195. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1046, 1047 (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 423). The
Middlesex case involved the appropriateness of applying Younger abstention to proceedings
instituted against an attorney by a local professional conduct committee. See Middlesex, 457
U.S. at 427; see also supra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of the Middlesex decision.
196. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1047.
197. See id. at 1046. Several cases have dealt with the determination of what is considered
as "ongoing." In Telco Communications,Inc. v. Carbaugh,the court held that state proceedings
were not ongoing while at the preliminary stage. See Telco Communications,Inc. v. Carbaugh,
885 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1989). Six years later, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with that ruling stating that where a state agency had merely contacted a party to inform him
of a complaint entered against him no ongoing proceedings existed. See Louisiana Debating
and Literary Ass'n v. New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483 (5th Cir. 1995).
198. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1047 (citing IOWA CODE § 135.65(1) (1997)).
199. See id. (citing IOWACODE § 135.66(3) (1997)).
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
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The court disagreed with this assessment and found that neither the
contact initiated by the Department nor PPI's request constituted ongoing state
proceedings.2 °3 The court stated that although contact between the two parties
had been established, that contact, by itself, was not sufficient to begin the
CON proceedings.2 " The court cited several authorities announcing similar
holdings.20 5 The court also stated that it did not agree that PPI's request
constituted a letter of intent as required by the CON statutes.2 6 Upon learning
that its proposal would fall under CON review, PPI had several options,
including revising its plans to remove itself from those regulations. 20 7 Taken
together, these factors did not convince the court that state administrative
proceedings were in fact ongoing and did not require the district court to
abstain.20 8
The court also found that the proceedings involved were not "judicial" in
nature. 2 9 The court cited Alleghany Corp. v. McCartney2 10 for interpretation
as to the type of proceedings that are considered to be judicial. 211 The court
stated that because the Department had conducted no investigation, held no
hearings, neither received nor collected any evidence, and kept no record, the
proceedings would not be considered judicial in nature. 2
Based on these findings, the court refused to accept the Department's
contention that the district court erred in granting PPI's injunction. 1 3 Younger
abstention did not apply in this instance as the first Middlesex criterion was not
satisfied.214

203. See id.
204. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1047.
205. See id.; see also supra note 197 for a discussion of these authorities.
206. See id. The court noted that this letter request by PPI was completely voluntary and
was simply an inquiry as to whether its project was reviewable. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 1048 (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432).
210. 896 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1990).
211. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1048. "Ajudicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces
liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist."
Alleghany, 896 F.2d at 1143.
212. See Atchison, 126 F.3dat 1048.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1046-47 (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. 423). "[T]he Supreme Court extended
the [Younger] doctrine to those non-criminal state court proceedings, including administrative
proceedings, where: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature .... " Id.
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CON Review as Imposing Unconstitutional Burden on Right of
Access to Abortion

The Eighth Circuit also reviewed the district court's holding that by
requiring PPI to submit to the CON review process, the Department had
imposed an unconstitutional burden on the right of access to abortion. 21' The
court found that the district court had not erred on this issue and upheld the
lower court's decision.216
The court stated that actions by a state that have the effect or purpose of
establishing a substantial barrier in the path of a woman seeking abortion may
be deemed unconstitutional. 2 7 The court noted that where a law enacted to
serve a legitimate state interest has the incidental effect of causing such a
burden, there is no presumption of unconstitutionality.2 ' The final determination of constitutionality depends on whether the state enactment places an
21 9
undue burden on an individual's right of access to abortion.
Historically CON statutes are upheld as legitimate methods by which to
further valid state interests. 220 While the mere validity of CON-like statutes
was not the central issue, the court stated that its main concern was with the
application of those statutes to the particular situation presented.221 Several
Department of Health officials testified at trial that PPI's clinic would have
been exempt under the tests normally applied to determine whether a proposed
project is subject to CON review. 222 Those same officials could not
explain
223
why PPI's clinic was required to submit to the CON requirements.
The court determined that the arbitrary application of the CON review
procedures presented in this case qualified as an unconstitutional burden and
215. See id. at 1048.
216. See id. at 1049.
217. Seeid. at 1048.
218. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1048 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 833). The Casey Court
stated that although it recognized a woman's right to abortion without undue interference, the
state's interest in protecting both mother and child provided it with some power to restrict
abortions after fetal viability. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
219. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1048. "Only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
220. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1048. For authorities upholding this proposition, see
Madarang v. Bermudes, 889 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that CON regulations did not
violate equal protection provisions as method of preventing establishment of unneeded health
care facilities); Women's Community Health Center v. Texas Health Facilities Commission,
685 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1982) (recognizing CON laws as important in furthering "[t]he state's
interest in ensuring economical health care for its citizens ... .
221. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1049.
222. See id.
223. See id.
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were not merely incidental in effect.224 The court also stated that the impositions served no purpose other than to make it more difficult for those involved
to gain access to abortion and could not be upheld. 5 Based on this reasoning,
the court held that the district court did not err in deciding that PPI would not
have been subject to CON review had it not proposed to offer abortions at its
new clinic.226
V.

SIGNIFICANCE

The most significant of the various aspects of the Atchison opinion is the
analysis and application of the controversial undue burden standard.227 This
decision should have a sustaining impact in three important areas. First, the
Eighth Circuit's adherence to the controversial undue burden standard
solidifies the standard's position in abortion law. As mentioned, the Ca.ey
Court's adoption of this standard received some measure of criticism. 228 This
criticism was largely based on the ambiguity as to its application. 229 While the
Atchison opinion failed to elaborate on the specific application of this standard,
it does signal that the Eighth Circuit will follow the Casey standard in a manner
consistent with that of the Casey opinion. 230
Second, Atchison provides some measure of insight into the application
of the undue burden standard to CON regulations in place in many states.23 '
The widespread use of these regulations makes it vitally important to ensure
that they are not found to impose undue burdens under the Casey standard.232
CON regulations, if properly established, are generally considered as furthering
legitimate state interests. 233 The Atchison opinion makes it clear that where the
CON requirements are imposed in an arbitrary manner they will not be
upheld.2 34 To avoid undue burden status, the application of such regulations
should be undertaken in a manner that is fair and evenhanded to all parties.
224. See id. The court stated that although the district court did not find that the state had
acted in bad faith, the totality of the circumstances suggested that subjecting PPI to CON review
"had the intended effect of impeding or preventing access to abortions." Id.
225. See id. at 1049.
226. See id.
227. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1048.
228. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disapproval of
this standard by Justice Scalia and other commentators.
229. See Tholen & Baird, supra note 155, at 1003.
230. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1048.
231. See McGinley, supra note 4, at 145.
232. See McGinley, supra note 4, at 143. As of 1995, thirty-eight states had some form of
CON laws in place. See McGinley, supra note 4, at 143.
233. See Atchison, 126 F.3d at 1049.
234. See id.
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Finally, the Atchison decision provides some guidance to state legislatures
in determining the type of abortion-related regulations that they may enact.
The Eighth Circuit's adherence to the Casey standard could possibly encourage
state legislatures to exercise their increased power to restrict early-term
abortions.23 At least one commentator has suggested that the very wording of
the Casey standard may encourage such attempts. 6 Whether they exercise this
power or not, state legislatures are now free to enact legislation consistent with
this opinion and Casey that will regulate early-term abortions.237
Unfortunately, it is not clear what the true effect of the Atchison decision
will be on future litigation. On one hand, the court's application of the undue
burden standard, modeled after Casey, implies that the Eighth Circuit will treat
similar abortion regulation cases in the manner suggested by some commentators.238 On the other hand, given the great criticism surrounding the new
standard, future interpretations by the courts expanding on its application
should have an even greater impact on this area of the law. The Eighth
Circuit's application of this standard to CON regulations will, however, have
certain emphasis on similar cases. With the widespread reliance on CON
regulations by the states,2 39 future litigation concerning this area is certain to
arise.
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235. See Howard, supra note 99, at 1498.
236. See Howard, supra note 99, at 1498. The author suggests that the Casey Court's
statement that a law purposefully enacted to hinder a woman's right would be unconstitutional
would encourage state legislatures to enact laws without such an express purpose. See Howard,
supra note 99, at 1498.
237. See supra Part III.B.3.a for a discussion of the implications of the Casey decision.
238. See Tholen & Baird, supra note 155, at 1003 for a discussion of this suggested
treatment.
239. See McGinley, supra note 4, at 144.

